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Abstract: The paper presents an application of a variance decomposition method for the sensitivity 
analysis of the thermal hydraulic (TH) model of the Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS) of 
an Advanced Pressurized Reactor (AP1000). The Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) is considered as 
the most representative accident for identifying the Failure Damage Domain (FDD) of the PCCS with 
respect to the individual and grouped inputs most affecting the final pressure at the end of the 
accidental transient. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The extension of nuclear safety considerations to severe accidents and the increased safety 
requirements have led to a growing interest in passive systems for the safety of the future nuclear 
reactors. As a result, all innovative reactor concepts make use of passive safety features, to a large 
extent in combination with active safety and operational systems [1],[2]. Passive systems are 
addressed as a resource for nuclear safety improvement because of their characteristics of simplicity, 
reduction of human interaction and reduction or avoidance of external electrical power and signals 
input [2]. 
On the other hand, passive safety systems are affected by uncertainties that have to be properly 
considered to guarantee their reliability by design [3]. In fact, passive systems rely only on natural 
forces, (such as gravity, natural circulation, compressed gas and other physical principles) for which 
the classical concepts of reliability analysis does not make sense as for the pumps, fans, diesels, 
chillers, or other devices used in active safety systems [4]. For example, to activate safety passive 
systems, usually only few fail-safe valves are required to open: in case of loss of power, they 
automatically open by stored energy (e.g. compressed gas or batteries). Anyway, although passive 
safety systems are significantly simpler than active ones because they comprise significantly fewer 
components (with straightforward benefits on the number of tests, inspections, and maintenance 
activities to be planned), uncertainty due to the lack of knowledge on the physical principles driving 
their performance, makes passive safety systems also exposed to potential failures for which they have 
been designed.  
Quantification of failure probability is one main goal of the system safety assessment and is usually 
achieved with the support of numerical models simulating the behavior of the real system. Sensitivity 
analysis has been widely used in engineering design to help the designers understanding the behavior 
of a model and make informed decisions regarding where to spend the engineering effort. Sensitivity 
analysis is used both in deterministic design and design under uncertainty to quantify how much the 
output of a model depends on the inputs and ranking variables importance [5]. These characteristics 
make sensitivity analysis particularly suited for both the design and the safety assessment of passive 
systems. Various qualitative or quantitative approaches have been developed for performing 
sensitivity studies, e.g. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), first-order differential analysis, response 
surface methodology, Fourier Amplitude Sensitivity Test (FAST) and Monte Carlo sampling [5],[6]. 
The AHP is a qualitative method based on the consultation of multiple experts, asked to express their 
judgments on the relative importance of parameters to determine the overall hierarchy with regards to 
the defined top goal. First-order differential analysis is a quantitative local approach that uses a finite 
difference approximation of small output variations around the nominal best estimate values to 
identify the critical parameters [7]. The Response surface methodology consists in approximating the 
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model function f(X) by a simple and faster mathematical model from a database of computations. 
FAST is a global, variance-based sensitivity analysis method based on the principle that a model (a 
function) can be expanded into a Fourier series and the Fourier coefficients and frequencies can be 
used to estimate the mean and variance of the model, and the partial variance of individual input 
parameters of the model [8]. Monte Carlo sampling consists of drawing samples of the basic variables 
according to their probability density functions and, then, feeding them into the performance function 
to retrieve the output probability density function. 
In this paper, we use the variance decomposition method [9] for performing the sensitivity analysis of 
a specific lumped thermal hydraulic (TH) model with the aim of quantifying the effects on the model 
output of the variability of not only single inputs but also groups of inputs, thus including also their 
interactions. The TH model simulates the behavior of a Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS) 
when a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) occurs in an Advanced Pressurized reactor (AP1000). 
PCCS is an innovation used in AP1000 reactors design, aimed at improving safety [10]. PCCS 
operation is based on natural circulation, so that physical process failure (i.e., the actual conditions are 
such that natural circulation cannot be established or maintained at the time of the LOCA) becomes 
the important failure mode[11]. To analyze this we propose to use the outcomes of sensitivity analysis 
for identifying the Failure Damage Domain (FDD), a concept already used in the evaluation of risk-
informed safety margins [12] and, more generally, to compactly represent the final state of a system as 
a function of the most important parameters which drive its response [13].  
The paper organization is as follows. For self-consistency and completeness, in Section 2, the Monte 
Carlo method for uncertainty propagation and the Variance Decomposition method for sensitivity 
analysis are briefly recalled. In Section 3, the main characteristics of the AP1000 reactor design are 
given (Subsection 3.1) and the accident scenario considered is described (Subsection 3.2). In Section 
4, the model for the long term PCCS pressure calculation is described. In Section 5, the results of the 
sensitivity analysis are provided and used for FDD identification. Finally, some conclusions are drawn 
in Section 6. 
 
 
2.  THE VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION METHOD FOR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
For simplicity of illustration, and without loss of generality, let us consider a model m whose output 
value y depends only on the values x1 and x2 of two uncertain input parameters X1 and X2, viz: 
     1 2( , )y m x x       (1) 
No hypotheses are made on the structure of the model.  
Monte Carlo is a global method for uncertainty analysis, which simply consists in drawing random 
samples of the uncertain input parameters values from their probability density functions and 
evaluating the model output for each set of sampled values.  
Operatively, consider a set of s realizations of the two input parameters drawn from the assigned pdfs 
 
1 1x
f x ,  
2 2x
f x , respectively: 
    
1 2
,j j jx x x      j=1,2,…s    (2) 
The model is evaluated for each of the s independently generated vectors 
j
, j=1,2,…,s, to obtain a 
corresponding set of output values: 
     1 2,
j j jy m x x  j=1,2,…s    (3) 
Such set represents an independent random sample of size s of the distribution of the output y and can 
be analyzed using classic statistical techniques for uncertainty analysis [5],[14]. 
The dependence of the value of the output variable (Y) on the value of one of the two input variables, 
e.g. X1, can be approximated by the expected value of Y  with respect to the other variable X2, 
conditioned on X1 being equal to a given value x1: 
           2122111
122
,* dxxxfxxmxYExy
XXX      (4) 
where  12
12
xxf
XX
 is the conditional probability density of X2 given X1. Note that, since X1 is fixed 
at x1, y* depends only on the variable X2. 
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To evaluate how the uncertainty in the input propagates to the output of the model, the variance of 
the distribution of the output variable Y is decomposed as follows (see [9],[15] for further details): 
          11 2121 XYVarEXYEVarYVar XXXX     (5) 
where X1 has been indicated explicitly as subscript of the variance and expectation operators to 
highlight that these are applied with respect to such variable.  
The sensitivity relevance of X1 can be associated to its contribution to the output variance, i.e. the 
term   121 XYEVar XX  in (5). Quantitatively, it is then customary to take the following measure as 
an index of the importance of the variable X1 with respect to its contribution to the uncertainty in the 
output Y : 
    
  
 YVar
XYEVar XX 12
1
21       (6) 
An operative procedure based on Monte Carlo sampling for estimating the index of importance of X1 
according to the definition (6) may be summarized as follows [16]: 
 
1. Sample a random population of s values of X1  sxxx 12111 ,...,,  
2. For  each value 
jx1 , sample r values 
kx2 , k=1,2,…,r from the conditioned distribution 
 j
XX
xxf 12
12
. 
3. Evaluate r output values  kjjk xxmy 21 , ; each of these values is an element of an output 
matrix of order (s,r). 
4. For each row j=1,2,…,s of the matrix, evaluate the estimate 
      


r
k
j
X
jkj xYEy
r
xy
1
11 2
1
*ˆ      (7) 
5. Estimate the expected value of Y 
    


s
j
j YExy
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y
1
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1
      (8) 
6. Estimate the variances 
       
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7. Estimate the index of importance 
   
  
 YV
xYEV XX
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
12
1
21       (11) 
The extension of the procedure to more than two input variables and to the sensitivity analysis of 
groups of input variables considered simultaneously is straightforward [9],[15]. 
The main advantages of the variance decomposition method for performing sensitivity analysis is that 
it does not impose any limitative hypothesis on the structure of the model as it is, for example, with 
the regression methods. Moreover, it allows a straightforward evaluation of the sensitivity importance 
of groups of variables and not only individual ones. On the other hand, this flexibility is paid by a 
computational burden larger than that of other methods, e.g. regression-based methods, due to the 
need of computing the model output several times (s·r) for the different input values sampled from 
the respective probability distributions.  
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3.  BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE AP1000 REACTOR DESIGN 
 
3.1.  General Aspects 
 
The Westinghouse AP1000 is a 1117 MWe (3415 MWth) pressurized water reactor (PWR), with 
layout simplification achieved through large operating margins and extensive implementation of 
passive safety systems for reduction of corrective maintenance actions in case of accident. The passive 
safety systems include passive Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) and Passive Containment 
Cooling System (PCCS). The PCCS provides the safety-related ultimate heat sink for the plant. It 
cools the containment following an accident, so that the pressure is effectively controlled within the 
safety limits of 0.4 MPa. During an accident, heat is removed from the containment vessel by the 
continuous, natural circulation of air, supplemented by evaporation of the water that drains by gravity 
from a tank located on top of the containment shield building by means of three redundant and diverse 
water drain valves. The steel containment vessel provides the heat transfer surface through which heat 
is removed from inside the containment and transferred to the atmosphere. In addition, even in case of 
failure of water drain, air-only cooling is supposed to be capable of maintaining the containment 
below the failure pressure [10]. Figure 1 shows the PCCS of the AP1000 [Westinghouse Electric 
Company promotional image]. 
 
Figure 1  AP1000 Passive Containment Cooling System [Westinghouse Electric Company] 
 
For the analysis of the functional performance of PCCS of the AP1000, TH analysis is carried out for 
safety assessment [17][18]. WGOTHIC [18] has been developed by Westinghouse as a conservative 
lumped parameter model for heat transfer with non-condensed gas, circulation and stratification for 
TH response analysis following i) loss of coolant accident (LOCA) ii) steam line break (SLB) 
accident, and containment integrity analysis. 
In this paper, we aim at the identification of the FDD after a LOCA; the simplified TH model used has 
been developed by [19]. 
 
3.2.  LOCA 
 
The LOCA is a most dangerous accident in Pressurized and Boiling Water Reactors (PWR and BWR, 
respectively), whereby the stored energy of the high pressure, high temperature coolant is released to 
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the containment by rupture of an exposed pipe. Thus, it is to be considered among the design basis 
accidents for AP1000 reactor design. 
In general a LOCA scenario develops as follows [20]: 
1) A double-ended “guillotine” pipe break in a primary coolant line allows the coolant flowing 
out from both ends; 
2) Coolant flashes into steam due to the large amount of stored energy and is discharged rapidly 
into the containment building; 
3) Reactor trip is automatically triggered by the protective system to assure continued sub-
criticality of the reactor core; 
4) The Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) cools down the core and prevents excessive 
decay heat-driven damage to its structures; 
5) Radioactivity in the coolant is retained by the containment structure with natural deposition 
processes and active removal systems, eventually reducing the overall levels of radioactivity; 
6) RHRS maintains ECCS effectiveness and reduces containment pressure. 
A TH code for simulating a LOCA is typically divided into four phases: 1) blowdown, that includes 
the accident initiation (when the reactor is in a steady-state full power operation condition) to the time 
at which pressure equalizes to the containment pressure; 2) refill, which includes the time from the end 
of the blowdown to the time when the ECCS refills the vessel lower plenum; 3) reflood, which begins 
when water starts flooding the core until when it is completely quenched; 4) post-reflood, which starts 
after the core quenching and energy is released to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by the RCS 
metal, core decay heat, and the steam generators that maximize the containment pressure. 
 
4.  THERMAL HYDRAULIC MODEL 
 
In the post-reflood phase, the steam produced in the RCS is cooled at the internal face of the steel 
containment vessel, and then the heat is conducted by the vessel and transferred to the air in the air 
channels, (see Figure 1). Cold air enters the channel through the three rows of air inlets and flows 
down to the bottom of the channels, where it is heated by the steel vessel up to the air diffuser to the 
environment. 
In this paper, a steady state, lumped parameters TH model is used to analyze the effect of the air 
temperature and reactor power on the PCCS function. The parameters of the TH model used for 
calculating the PCCS capability of condensing the steam produced, and their distributions, are listed in 
Table 1. If the steam cannot be condensed, the vapor cumulates in the containment and results in an 
overpressure accidental scenario: then, the success criteria for the PCCS is set at Pcontainment < 0.4 
MPa. 
The selection of the distributions of the parameters in Table 1 is based on expert judgment and 
literature review [3],[21]. Three distributions have been used: seasonal, normal and uniform. Seasonal 
relates to the external air temperature Tinlet and pressure Pair variability, as inferred by historical data 
collected by a representative Chinese Automatic Weather Station (CAWS) in different months. 
Normal distributions, e.g. for the LOCA steam temperature, Tsteam, are listed as truncated distributions 
with mean µ and support equal to 4ơ where ơ is the standard deviation. For uniform distributions, e.g. 
for the steam mass flow rate G, the supports from “Lower value” to “Upper value” are reported. 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the steady state containment pressure values obtained from 10000 
runs of the TH code, with parameters values randomly sampled from the distributions of Table 1; the 
total computational time is 1894 s on a laptop machine powered by an Intel core2duo P7550 dual core 
processor running at 2.26 GHz. A value of 0.55 MPa is automatically assigned to the pressure, when it 
exceeds the safety limit of 0.4 MPa. 
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Table 1: List of parameters distributions 
 
 
Parameter Description Unit 
Type of 
distribution 
Lower 
value 
Upper 
value 
  
1 G 
Steady state LOCA mass 
flow rate kg/s uniform 6 11 
  
2 Tinlet External air temperature °C seasonal 2 39 
  
3 Pair Pressure of inlet air MPa seasonal 0.09837 0.1010965 
  
 
Parameter Description Unit 
Type of 
distribution 
Mean 
value, µ 
Standard 
Deviation, 
ơ (% of µ) µ-4ơ µ+4ơ 
4 Tsteam LOCA steam temperature °C normal 250 5 200 300 
5 Psteam LOCA steam pressure MPa normal 0.1 5 0.08 0.12 
6 ρprimary 
Water density in primary 
circuit kg/m3 normal 666.7 2 613.36 720.04 
7 Pprimary 
Pressure of primary 
circuit MPa normal 15.5 2 14.26 16.74 
8 V Containment volume m3 normal 58333 1 55999.68 60666.32 
9 t 
Containment wall 
thickness m normal 0.04455 0.5 4.37E-02 4.54E-02 
10 D Containment diamenter m normal 39.62 0.5 38.83 40.41 
11 H Containment height m normal 34.12 0.5 33.44 34.8 
12 W 
Width of air buffle 
outside containment m normal 0.92 0.5 0.9 0.94 
13 H1 
Height of the download in 
air buffle m normal 38.11 0.5 37.35 38.87 
14 H2 
Height of the upload in air 
buffle m normal 59.89 0.5 58.69 61.09 
15 D3 Diameter of the air outlet m normal 9.75 0.5 9.56 9.95 
16 H3 Height of the air outlet m normal 6 0.5 5.88 6.12 
17 D4 Diameter of uphead m normal 39.62 0.5 38.83 40.41 
18 H4 Height of uphead m normal 11.47 0.5 11.24 11.7 
19 d 
Diffusive coefficient 
(water) m2/s normal 2.55E-05 20 5.10E-06 4.59E-05 
20 λ 
Heat conduction of the 
wall 
W/(m 
K) normal 54 5 43.2 64.8 
 
Parameter Description Unit 
Type of 
distribution 
Lower 
value 
Upper 
value 
  
21 K Air channel rugosity - uniform 0.00285 0.00315 
  
22 f1 Friction factor of corner - uniform 0.475 0.525 
  
23 f2 Friction factor of inlet - uniform 0.9025 0.9975 
  
24 f3 Friction factor of pipeup - uniform 0.1425 0.1575 
  
25 f4 Friction factor of pipeout - uniform 0.1425 0.1575 
  
26 f5 Friction factor of pipecold - uniform 0.1425 0.1575 
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Figure 2  Histogram of the steady state containment pressure from 10000 runs of the TH code. 
 
5.  FDD BY VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
The majority of input sampled vectors lead the system to succeeding in maintaining the pressure 
within the limit of 0.4 MPa, but there is a not negligible probability of exceedance of approximately 
10%.  
 
5.1.  Variance Decomposition Sensitivity Analysis 
 
For variance decomposition sensitivity analysis, in our case, we select s=90 and r=140 so that 12600 
runs of the TH code are performed for each one of the 26 parameters listed in Table 1, for a total of 
327000 simulations (total computation time is 58251 s ). The η
2
 importance indexes of all the 
parameters are reported in Figure 3. The importances of G and Tinlet are clearly predominant and the 
importances of the other parameters are negligible. 
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Figure 3  η
2
 of the 26 parameters. 
 
A group analysis is also performed, in which the importance index η
2
 of groups of parameters is 
computed. Four groups have been considered: external conditions, primary coolant conditions, system 
geometry, materials properties and friction factors. For each group, (s·r) simulations with s=90, r=140, 
(50400 in total) have been performed. 
The specific groups are: 
 
a. External conditions:    Tinlet, Pair 
b. Primary coolant conditions:   G, Psteam, Tsteam, ρprimary, Pprimary, 
c.   System geometry:    V, t, D, H, W, H1, H2, D3, H3, D4, H4 
d. Material properties and friction factors  d, λ, K, f1, f2, f3, f4, f5 
 
The results of the group variance decomposition (Table 2), again show a clear predominance 
of Tinlet and G in determining the variance of the steady state containment pressure: in fact, the 
groups a and b have values of η
2
 greatly larger than groups c and d. 
 
Table 2 η
2
 for groups of inputs 
Group η
2
 
External conditions 0.2935 
Primary coolant conditions 0.2648 
System geometry 0.0078 
Material properties and friction factors 0.0095 
 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management PSAM 12, June 2014, Honolulu, Hawaii 
 
Figure 4 η
2
 of the four groups of parameters. 
 
We can conclude that under the assumptions of Table 1, G and Tinlet are by far the most important 
parameters for obtaining the PCCS response in terms of steady state containment pressure. This result 
aligns with our prior expectations for what regard the predominance of G and Tinlet with respect to the 
other parameters. In fact, not only G and Tinlet are directly linked to the energy entering (G) and 
leaving (Tinlet) the PCCS but they have also, by far, the largest uncertainties, as reported in Table 1. 
The other input parameters have low uncertainties due to better knowledge, and their effects on the 
output are modest even when sampled at maximum or minimum values of their range. 
On the other hand, the finding that G and Tinlet are almost equally important (i.e. equally responsible 
for the output variability) is an information difficult to suppose a priori of the sensitivity analysis. 
because of the different distributions and the different relations (also nonlinear) with the model output. 
 
5.2.  Failure Damage Domain 
 
An intuitive way to gather together all the information resulting from the previous analysis is the FDD 
map. This map resumes the information provided by both the MC uncertainty propagation (Figure 2) 
and the variance decomposition analysis (Figures 5 and 6). It can be useful for i) further sensitivity 
analysis without TH calculations, ii) safety margins visualization, iii) identification of mitigation 
strategies, iv) discussion with the regulator [13].  
Figure 5 shows the FDD in the plane of the two most important parameters Tinlet and G, representing 
the failure probability of the PCCS after a LOCA. 
 
 
Figure 5 Failure damage domain map 
0,2935 
0,2648 
0,0095 0,0078 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this work, we have performed a Monte Carlo sampling uncertainty propagation, variance 
decomposition sensitivity analysis and FDD identification with respect to a TH code that calculates the 
post reflood steady state pressure after a LOCA in the AP1000 passive pressure containment. The 
sensitivity analysis has highlighted that among all the input parameters of the code, G and Tinlet  are by 
far the most important. The results of the analysis have been used to generate the FDD, which gives 
useful safety insights. Computational time is an aspect of primary importance in sensitivity analysis 
and might be a limiting factor when resorting to variance decomposition. Thus, future work will tackle 
this problem by developing an innovative sensitivity method that limits the need of repeating several 
model solutions in correspondence of different sampled input values for properly mapping the input-
output relationship. 
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